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THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEM OF BANKRUPTCY

ETHICS: SQUARE PEG, ROUND HOLE
Nancy B. Rapoport*

I. INTRODUCTION
I have spent a large part of my career to date focusing on the issue
of how bankruptcy lawyers should behave.' In part, my attraction to this
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. An earlier version of this
Article was presented at Hofstra University School of Law's 2001 Legal Ethics Conference, Legal
Ethics: What Needs Fixing? Many thanks to Professor Roy Simon for inviting me to participate in
the conference; to my research assistants, H.C. Chang and Alison Chien; to Susan Evangelist (who
always saves my bacon); to Jack Ayer, Chuck Kettlewell, George Kuney, Ronald Mann, Jay
Westbrook, and Jeff Van Niel for reviewing earlier drafts; and to Harlin Womble, for sending me
valuable e-mails after my presentation at the University of Texas School of Law's Twentieth
Annual Bankruptcy Conference in November 2001. Let me tell you: There is nothing so scary as
describing a pointy-headed intellectual's theory (mine) of bankruptcy ethics to a group of very
experienced bankruptcy lawyers.
1. See, e.g., C.R. Bowles, Jr. & Nancy B. Rapoport, Has the DIP's Attorney Become the
Ultimate Creditors' Lawyer in Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases?, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
47, 49 (1997) [hereinafter DIP'sAttorney]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, OurRules: The Need
for a Uniform Code of Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 45, 46-47 (1998)
[hereinafter Rapoport, Our House]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Seeing the Forest and the Trees: The
ProperRole of the BankruptcyAttorney, 70 IND. L.J. 783, 785 (1995) [hereinafter Rapoport, Forest
and Trees]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre: The Problem of
Potential Conflicts of interest in Bankruptcy, 26 CONN. L. REv. 913, 916-17 (1994) [hereinafter
Rapoport, Potential Conflicts]; Nancy B. Rapoport, Turning the Microscope on Ourselves: SelfAssessment by Bankruptcy Lawyers of PotentialConflicts of Interest in Columbus, Ohio, 58 OHIO
ST. LJ. 1421, 1422-23 (1997) [hereinafter Rapoport, Microscope].
Some wonderful recent conflicts articles include: John D. Ayer, Professional
Responsibility in Bankruptcy Cases, in 1 CHAPTER 11 BusINESs REORGANIZATIONS 1 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, SB37, May 8-10, 1993); Michael L. Cook, Conflict of Interest Issues in
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, in ETHICS IN CONTExT 111 (PLI N.Y. Prac. Skills Course,
Handbook Series No. F0-0059, 1999); Arthur J. Gonzalez, Conflicts of Interest and OtherEthical
Issues Facing Bankruptcy Lawyers: Is DisinterestednessNecessary to Preserve the Integrity of the
Bankruptcy System?, 28 HoFsTRA L. REV. 67, 67 (1999) (discussing ethical issues facing
bankruptcy lawyers); Karen Gross & Jeanne M. Weisneck, Selected Bibliography on Ethics for
Bankruptcy Professionals,68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 419, 419-20 (1994) (listing articles addressing the
issue of bankruptcy ethics); William I. Kohn et al., Deciphering Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy
Representation: An Update, 105 COM. L.J. 95, 96 (2000) (discussing current conflicts of interest
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subject stems from my first year of practice at a law firm, when I was
asked to do a conflicts check. I can't remember whether the conflicts
check involved a new client or a current client, and I can't remember
whether the client was a secured creditor or an unsecured creditor. What
I do remember is that, as I was filling out the computer form that would
initiate the check, I marked every single current client as potentially
adverse. Not surprisingly, the completed check was over an inch thick,
and it took a while to clear the "conflicts."
In addition to first-year associate naivet6, there was something
substantive going on. I knew, even as a fledgling associate, that if we
represented a creditor in a bankruptcy case, then there was at least the
chance that our client was going to be fighting over the same dollars that
other creditors also wanted. If our client was an unsecured creditor, for
example, why wouldn't it want to disqualify other unsecured creditors so
that its piece of the pie was at least a little bit larger? Why wouldn't it
want to see if it could prove that a secured creditor's claim was
improperly perfected, so that it could free up that collateral for division
rules applicable to bankruptcy attorneys); Gerald K. Smith, Conflicts of Interest in Workouts and
Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 48 S.C. L. REV. 793, 810 (1997) (discussing the ethical
implications of conflicts related to workouts and reorganizations); Gerald K. Smith, StandardsFor
the Employment of Professionalsin Bankruptcy Cases: A Response to ProfessorZywicki's "Case
for Retaining the DisinterestednessRequirement for Debtor in Possession's Professionals," 18
Miss. C. L. REV. 327, 327 (1998) [hereinafter Smith, Standardsfor Employment] (proposing an
alternative method for "more fair and efficient administration" of the bankruptcy system); Hon.
Susan Pierson Sonderby & Kathleen M. McGuire, A Gray Area in the Law? Recent Developments
Relating to Conflicts of Interest and the Retention of Attorneys in Bankruptcy Cases, 105 COM. L.J.
237, 238 (2000) (collecting and analyzing recent court decisions relating to bankruptcy conflicts of
interest); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Fees and Inherent Conflicts of Interest, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 287, 287 (1993) (discussing ethics and fee arrangements with respect to representation of
debtors in possession); Charles W. Wolfram, The Boiling Pot of Lawyer Conflicts in Bankruptcy, 18
Miss. C. L. REV. 383, 383 (1998) (discussing the shortcomings of traditional ethics rules with
respect to bankruptcy conflicts of interest, especially as regards small bankruptcies); Todd J.
Zywicki, Mend It, Don't End It: The Case for Retaining the Disinterestedness Requirement for
Debtor in Possession's Professionals, 18 Miss. C. L. REV. 291, 293 (1998) (discussing the
necessity of the "disinterestedness" requirement for baikruptcy attorneys); Christopher M. Ashby,
Comment, Bankruptcy Code Section 327(a) and Potential Conflicts of Interest-Always or Never
Disqualifying?, 29 Hous. L. REV. 433, 436-37 (1992) (discussing the disqualification test and
potential conflicts of interest in the bankruptcy context); Alexander G. Benisatto & Alyson M.
Fiedler, Note, The DisinterestedStandard of Section 327(a): Applying an Equitable Solution for
PotentialConflicts in Small Bankruptcies, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 363, 363 (1999) (discussing
why the American Law Institute and National Bankruptcy Review Commission apparently
"sidestep[ped] the entire field" of bankruptcy ethics); Joseph D. Vaccaro & Marc R. Milano, Note,
Section 327(a): A Statute in Conflict: A ProposedSolution to Conflicts of Interest in Bankruptcy, 5
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 237, 241 (1997) (discussing current ethics rules as they relate to
bankruptcy and proposing a new model).
2. I was an associate in Morrison & Foerster from 1986-1991. We didn't represent too many
debtors in bankruptcy cases, but we had a thriving practice in creditor-side representation.
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among the unsecured creditors? Likewise, if we represented a secured
creditor, wouldn't our client always be trying to defend against attacks
from unsecured creditors?3 The potential conflicts were almost infinite.4
Of course, bankruptcy cases don't involve internecine war on the
scale that I had imagined Most of the time, most of the creditors are
acting in concert, trying to make the most money from an enterprise that
is hemorrhaging money. But sometimes, creditors don't act in concert.
Sometimes, they do fight. How was I supposed to be able to predict,
when I was doing a conflicts check, which ones would cooperate with
each other and which ones would engage in skirmishes?
That, in a nutshell, is the problem with current ethics codes. They
assume that lawyers will know, at the beginning of a case, whose
interests will diverge. Perhaps that is a safe assumption in traditional
litigation, with one plaintiff and one defendant, when it is clear that a
lawyer should not represent both sides in the same case. But it's a
foolish assumption in a complex Chapter 11 case.' So either the use of
state ethics codes or the nature of bankruptcy, cases has to give if we're
going to help bankruptcy lawyers stay on the straight and narrow. And
the nature of bankruptcy cases isn't likely to change.
11.

A BETTER WAY TO DESCRIBE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN
BANKRUPTCY CASES: DTACS

What I love about bankruptcy cases (especially Chapter 11 cases) is
the multiple ways in which the parties' interests align, depending on the
issue at hand.9 At first, the line-up is easy: it's the debtor ° against the

3. And don't even get me started on partnerships, holding companies, and the like.
4. Walter Effross has compared the strategy choices in Chapter 11 cases to a game of Go.
See Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1, at 65 n.99. And it's not just a naive new associate who can
get confused by the difficulties of dealing with bankruptcy conflicts. Sophisticated lawyers have had
problems with these issues as well. See, e.g., United States v. Gellene, 182 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir.
1999) (affirming the fraud conviction of a partner at a major New York law firm, who had claimed
it was "bad judgment" that led him to conclude that he did not need to disclose certain connections
in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case); In re Leslie Fay Cos., 175 B.R. 525, 526-27 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1994) (holding that Weil, Gotshal & Manges had failed to disclose "disabling conflicts" even
though it had represented all debtors "competently and loyally"); see also Karen Donovan, John
Gellene Sentenced To 15 Months, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 10, 1998, at A6.
5. At least, not all of them.
6. See Rapoport, Microscope, supra note 1, at 1422 & n.5.
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2001) [hereinafter MODEL RuLES].
8. Without beating some seriously dead horses, see cases cited supra note 4.
9. For now, I'm referring to commercial Chapter 11 cases. I'll discuss the distinction
between commercial cases and consumer cases later in this Article. See infra notes 45-46 and
accompanying text.
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creditors." Creditors want to be paid, and the debtor wants to survive as
an enterprise (and may therefore not want to pay 100 cents on the
dollar).
Things
start to get muddy as soon as the value of a claim becomes
12
an issue. Perhaps the claim of a secured creditor isn't fully secured (the
value of the asset is less than the value of the claim). 13 Perhaps the
secured claim wasn't properly perfected,' 4 which turns the secured claim
into an unsecured claim. If an unsecured creditor starts gunning for a
secured creditor, all sorts of problems with the claim might be
discovered.
To put an ethics spin on it, try this: You routinely represent a bank
that often forgets to file the financing statement that would perfect a
security interest. In a newly filed bankruptcy case, you want to represent
the estate's largest unsecured creditor. Your unsecured creditor client
can't make a claim against the secured property and will only be able to
recover from unsecured assets. Those assets will get bigger if the
security interest of the bank is found to be defective. There's an
automatic conflict of interest: You know something about the bank that
your unsecured creditor client could use against the bank. If, on the other
hand, your bank client always perfects its security interests and always
takes enough collateral to oversecure its claim, then the secured creditor
and the unsecured creditor are in two different universes, as far as the
bankruptcy case is concerned. The secured creditor will be paid from the
value of the collateral, and the unsecured creditor will be paid from
unsecured assets-no conflict of interest.
Valuation isn't the only part of the case that might raise some
conflicts issues. Assume that the secured bank has done something
terribly, terribly wrong to the debtor, such as micromanaging the
10. Bankruptcy mavens will notice that I haven't used the more proper "debtor in possession"
("DIP") term. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1994). This Article involves ethics issues predominantly,
and not bankruptcy issues; therefore, I'm using the more generic term in order to keep the flow of
the discussion moving.
11. The debtor-versus-creditor tension at the start of the case is true whether the case was
initiated by the debtor (a voluntary case), see 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1994), or by the creditors (an
involuntary case), see id. § 303. Prepackaged Chapter 11 cases, in which the debtor and most of the
significant creditors agree, before the filing of the bankruptcy petition, how the estate is to be
administered, may not be as overtly adversarial as traditional bankruptcy cases, but the basic
adversarial facts remain: The creditors have claims against the debtor.
12. Valuation can come into play near the beginning of a case, see, e.g., id. § 362(d), (g)
(determining debtor's equity in property with respect to stay relief motions), in the middle of a case,
see, e.g., id. § 544 (describing criteria for exercise of the trustee's avoidance powers), or when a
plan of reorganization is being confirmed, see id. § 1129.
13. See id. § 506.
14. See id. § 544(a)(3).
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debtor's business into the ground. The debtor might have a cause of
action against the bank15 or want to subordinate the bank's claim behind
that of the other creditors in the case. If the debtor wins, the unsecured
creditors win, too; any recovery from the bank will put more unsecured
assets into the bankruptcy estate, and the unsecured creditors will
receive a larger payout than they would have had the bank behaved
properly. In such a scenario, the debtor and the unsecured creditors are
not in conflict with each other, but their interests do conflict with those
of the bank.
The problem with most bankruptcy conflicts is that they spring up
for a particular issue-if that issue is raised in the case-and then they
disappear. In an earlier article, I called these conflicts "dormant,
temporary, actual conflicts" ("DTACs"). 16 A DTAC might not ever
occur, depending on the choices that the parties in the case may make
(e.g., not to fight over whether a claim was properly perfected or not to
subordinate a claim). If the conflict does occur, it is likely to be issuespecific, meaning that, after the particular issue is resolved, the conflict
disappears. While the issue is being litigated, there is an actual conflict;
afterwards, like the Titanic slipping under the waves for the last time,
it's as if the conflict never occurred.
State ethics codes don't cover DTACs. They should, since DTACs
can occur in other fields (such as family law or class actions17), but they
don't. So what is a bankruptcy lawyer to do-pretend that a bankruptcy
case works just like any other traditional litigation case? Assume that the
state ethics rules don't apply? Or hope for a change in the ethics rules?
III. THE PROBLEM WITH CURRENT ETHICS RULES

I'm not a fan of the current Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
For one thing, I think that they focus too much on the litigation side of
lawyering and not enough on the transactional side.' They also put more
faith in the adversary system than I think is prudent. 9 I would want to
see significant reform even if the rules could handle the situations that

15. For example, a "lender liability" lawsuit. Those types of lawsuits have waxed and waned
in popularity. See, e.g., Steven A. Meyerowitz, Note from the Senior Executive Editor,
118 BANKING L.J. 197, 198 (2001) ("U.S.-based banks continue to be wary of lender liability
lawsuits.").
16. See Rapoport, PotentialConflicts, supranote 1, at 916.

17. See id. at966-69, 972-75.
18.
19.

See Rapoport, Forestand Trees, supranote 1, at 790-91.
See id. at 787.
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arise in bankruptcy cases. But there is another reason to rethink state
ethics codes: the changing nature of legal practice.
Enough has been said about the ethics problems of
multijurisdictional practice that I need not repeat it here,20 except to point
out that most Chapter 11 bankruptcy lawyers have a national practice.
The high-profile bankruptcy lawyers are involved in cases all over the
country, and I am willing to hazard a guess that they do not hold state
licenses in each jurisdiction. What happens when something that is
ethical in one jurisdiction (for example, referral fees in Texas") is
unethical in another (referral fees in most other states22)? No matter what
we do to fix other, long-standing problems in state ethics codes, we are
going to have to spend significant time grappling with the ethics issues
raised by an increasingly multijurisdictional world.
A. A PartialSolution: A FederalCode of Bankruptcy Ethics
We can't cure all of the ills inherent in state ethics codes without a
total revamp, and Ethics 20003 and similar attempts to revise the Model
Rules aren't total revamps. Although I've testified about the need for
separate bankruptcy ethics rules, I found it difficult to draft a workable
proposed Model Rule that would cover DTACs.2 But that didn't stop me
from arguing that bankruptcy lawyers need a separate set of rules.

20. See Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1, at 77-78.
21. See Chachere v. Drake, 941 S.W.2d 193, 195-96 (Tex. App. 1996) (analyzing TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.04 (1990) in holding that referral fees are not
contrary to public policy, even when referring attorney performs no actual service). The division of
fees is legal "unless the manner of the sharing is prevented by operation of law" (i.e., failure to
disclose to client). See id.
22. See MODEL RULES, supra note 7, R. 1.5(e) & cmt. 4 (allowing division of a fee only if:
(1) the client is advised and does not object; (2) the fee is reasonable; and (3) the division is
proportionalto the service performed by each lawyer).
23. For the background of Ethics 2000, the American Bar Association committee charged
with considering changes in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, see Press Release, ABA,
ABA Establishes "Ethics 2000" to Evaluate Legal Ethics (July 24, 1997), available at
http:llwww.abanet.orglmedialjul97/eth2000.htnrl (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). For the draft changes,
see generally COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, ABA, REPORT WfTH
RECOMMENDATION
TO
THE
HOUSE
OF
DELEGATES
(2001),
available
at
http:llwww.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-whole-rpt.doc (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
24. I'm not the only one who has found it difficult to craft rules for bankruptcy ethics. Even
the American Law Institute ("ALI") has refused to take on the subject in its Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers. If you want to read a first-hand account of the ALI's efforts to resolve (and
then, ultimately, its decision not to resolve) bankruptcy conflicts, see Smith, Standards for
Employment, supra note 1, at 360-61; Wolfram, supra note 1, at 383-85; Todd J. Zywicki, Of
Bubbling Pots and Bankruptcy Ethics:A Comment on Wolfram and Smith, 18 MISS. C. L. REv. 399,
399-401 (1998).
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In a paper that I presented at the Association of American Law
Schools ("AALS") Creditors' Rights Section meeting a few years ago,'
I argued that bankruptcy lawyers needed a separate set of ethics rules
and that it was constitutionally permissible for Congress to create a
federal code of bankruptcy ethics. 26 The more difficult argument-that
federal bankruptcy ethics rules should supplant state ethics rules after a
petition has been filed-is trickier, given that states traditionally license
(and regulate) the lawyers practicing in their state. But because
bankruptcy cases are federal cases, in federal courts, a federal code of
ethics makes more sense to me than does the current patchwork quilt of
state rules, none of which deal with DTACs.
Not only are state laws incomplete in and of themselves, but they
can also conflict with each other. That's all well and good if a lawyer is
admitted in only one state, but what if she's not? Right now, a hotshot
Chapter 11 lawyer may hold more than one state license to practice law.
(She could be licensed in New York, Delaware, California, etc.) Each of
her licenses requires her to follow that licensing state's ethics rules. 27
When she appears in bankruptcy court,.2 that court may have adopted the
ethics rules of the state in which it is located, or it may have created its
own rules. 29 Most of the time, all of the ethics rules will say the same
thing; after all, no ethics rule will condone incompetence or conflicts of
interest. But the overlay of state and bankruptcy court ethics rules is
unnecessarily complex.
Other areas of law have their own ethics rules (most notably, those
governing the behavior of federal prosecutors), so there is a precedent
for specialized rules. When I proposed a separate code of ethics for
bankruptcy lawyers, I justified it by asking five questions:

25. See Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1, at 45 n.**. The American Bankruptcy Institute
Law Review published the papers that had been presented at that meeting in a symposium edition, of
which Our House was a part.
26. Because the promulgation of bankruptcy laws is reserved to Congress in the Constitution,
the promulgation of rules related to lawyers practicing bankruptcy law can also be congressionally
created. See id. at 74.
27. And those rules can conflict. See supranotes 21-22 and accompanying text.
28. If a lawyer is admitted to practice in a federal district court, she is admitted to practice in
the federal bank-uptcy court of that district as well. See Rapoport, Our House, supranote 1, at 4546 & 46 n.4 (citing NAT'L BANKR. REvIEv COMM'N, FiNAL REPORT 39 (1997) (Recommendation
No. 3.3.4)).
29. See Linda S. Mullenix, Multiforum FederalPractice:Ethics and Erie, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 89, 98-101 (1995); Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1, at 51.
30. Other practice areas--e.g., family law, environmental law, military law-have their own
ethics rules as well. See Rapoport, OurHouse, supranote 1, at 57-64.
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1. Is there a poor31fit between the practice area and the general
state ethics rules?
2. Is the practice area populated with "repeat players," so that
there are norms within that practice area?32
3. Is there a problem of overlapping
ethics codes in the practice
33
area (e.g., state and federal codes)?
4. How easy would it be to impose a single code of ethics on
that practice area? 4
5. Do the benefits of a single code outweigh the benefits of
state-by-state experimentation? 33
But even if all of the answers point to a uniform bankruptcy ethics code,
the mechanics of establishing such a code are tricky. I'm not particularly
worried about a federalism argument: Bankruptcy law is federal.36 I am
worried about who would be doing the drafting: Congress?3 7 The federal
courts, through advisory committees and their inherent rule-making
power?38 On balance, I prefer that the rules come from the courts and not
from Congress. 39 After all, lawyers will be playing on the courts' turf.
The second tricky part is determining when the state ethics rules
would leave off and the federal rules would kick in. Some DTACs
would occur as the debtor slides toward bankruptcy, as creditors jockey
for preferential treatmente0 and cut side deals. But it is not possible to
31. See id. at 65.
32. See id. at 70.
33. See id. at 72-73.
34. See id. at 74.
35. See id.
36. Even within bankruptcy law, some state-by-state experimentation exists. The Bankruptcy
Code, as it is currently written, permits states to "opt out" of the federal exemption scheme in favor
of their own exemption statutes. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1994). Note, however, that the federal
code is explicitly permitting state experimentation; the state is not forcing the federal law to bend.
37. Too scary to contemplate, given how easily Congress can be lobbied by special interests.
See Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1, at 91. The proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code-eliminating state exemptions, creating a "means test" to force debtors to file under Chapter
13 rather than giving them the choice of Chapters 13 or 7-have, for the most part, been suggested
by the wealthy credit card industry. See Bankruptcy Reform Takes a Holiday, 35 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
(LRP), at At, A6 (Nov. 30, 1999).
38. At least, the Advisory Committee to the federal courts would be comprised of appointed,
not elected, members, thereby reducing the risk of capture. See Rapoport, Our House, supra note 1,
at 91-92.
39. See id. at 89-90 & 90 n.217.
40. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
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have the federal ethics rules kick in before a bankruptcy petition is filed.
Court-promulgated rules only take effect after the court has
jurisdiction." The prebankruptcy ethics issues appear to be relegated to
state ethics rules, notwithstanding the risk of DTACs outside
bankruptcy.42 A bright line rule, which suspends the effect of state ethics
rules during the bankruptcy case (supplanting the state rules with the
bankruptcy ethics rules), is the most workable. 43 The true question is
whether the creation of federal bankruptcy ethics rules would make the
problems better or worse. And the only way to find out is with some
empirical research.

IV. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS
After I wrote the Our House article, arguing for a separate federal
bankruptcy code of ethics,' 1 started to wonder whether my solution was
too broad. Was it the case that all bankruptcy cases involved DTACs and
needed a separate code of ethics, or was it just the complex Chapter 11
cases?
Most bankruptcy lawyers would agree that complex Chapter 11
cases are a world apart from the usual consumer bankruptcy cases (the
Chapter 13s and Chapter 7s of the world).45 Jean Braucher has studied
consumer cases extensively, and her description of consumer cases
suggests that they are different in kind from commercial cases. 4 If
commercial cases and consumer cases are different in kind, then might
not ethics issues in commercial cases and consumer cases likewise be
different in kind? This question cries out for empirical study. Why
change the status quo if the change might not be necessary (or even an
improvement)?
I am by no means well-versed in empirical studies.47 Nonetheless,
I've begun a three-part study to test my hypothesis: that the only real
difference between traditional ethics issues and bankruptcy ethics issues
is in the commercial Chapter 11 context. If my hypothesis is correct,
then the only changes that need to be made are those for Chapter 11

41. See MODEL RULES, supra note 7, R. 8.5 & cmt. 4 (noting that a lawyer is subject to the
ethics rules of the court that has jurisdiction over the proceedings).
42. See Rapoport, OurHouse, supranote 1, at 93 & n.233.
43. See id. at 94.
44. See supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text.
45. Chapter 12 cases, involving family farmers, are beyond the scope of this Article.
46. See Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures,
67 Am. BANKR. L.J. 501,502 (1993).
47. See Rapoport, Microscope, supra note 1, at 1423 & n.9.
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cases. The rest of the time, state ethics codes will be no worse than
anything I might propose.
A.

The Docket Study

The first part of my study consisted of a pilot docket study 4s to see
if ethics issues are regularly represented in cases under Chapters 7, 11,
12, and 13. Research assistants reviewed cases filed in Lincoln,
Nebraska,49 over a period of four years to see if any of the following
types of entries raised ethics issues in consumer or commercial cases:
o appointment of counsel, and any objections to appointment of

counsel;
o fee applications, and any objections to fee applications; or
o orders to show cause that related to an attorney's conduct rather

than to the case itself.
In addition, the research assistants were supposed to flag any other
"interesting" entries in any of the docket sheets.
We studied all of the Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 cases filed during
this period, since the total number of Chapter 11"0 and Chapter 1251 cases
was small. We also selected every tenth case of the cases filed under
Chapters 752 or 13.
Not surprisingly, very little bubbled to the surface as a result of this
study. Most likely, the ethics issues were settled informally 54 and, of the
few that did make it onto a docket, the pleadings didn't reveal much
useful information about the differences in ethics issues in consumer and
commercial cases. Generally speaking, though, different chapters did
result in different ethics issues-not enough to provide statistically
significant results, but enough to encourage future study.

48. Well, actually, my research assistants did the heavy lifting on this one, after I suggested
what sorts of docket entries they should be reviewing to try to tease out the ethics issues.
49. At the time of the study, I was the Dean of the University of Nebraska College of Law,
located in Lincoln, Nebraska.
50. Eighteen cases.
51. One hundred seventeen cases.
52. Three hundred fifty-nine cases.
53. Three hundred forty-three cases.
54. Of course, there's always the possibility that my study was flawed.
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The ethics issues in the docket study can be grouped as follows:
Chapter
7
11
12
13

Ethics Issue Presented
Mostly competency issues, with some conflicts issues.
Mostly conflicts issues (with disgorgement of fees being the
usual remedy for conflicts problems).
Mostly issues involving the reasonableness of fees.
Mostly competency issues, with some conflicts issues.

My tentative conclusion, after the pilot study, is that my hypothesis
looks promising. The cases filed under Chapter 11 tended to have more
problems with conflicts, and the other cases tended to have more to do
with competency and fees. Not that there aren't problems with the
structure of the docket study: for one thing, the low stakes of Chapter 7
cases might well cause a lot of lawyers to decide that it's not worth
spending the money to raise any ethics issues. Moreover, my consumer
vs. commercial classification by chapter is not an exact science. Not all
Chapter 7 cases involve consumers, and some Chapter 12 cases involve
sophisticated agribusinesses. But, as a rough first cut, the sorting-out of
these ethics issues led me to move on to the next stage of my study.
B. The Study of State DisciplinaryCases
If bankruptcy docket sheets weren't illuminating, then perhaps that
was due to the fact that the really "meaty" ethics issues are filed against
lawyers in state disciplinary proceedings. After all, ethical violations in
bankruptcy can give rise to disciplinary action. Although not all
disciplinary cases are reported in LEXIS or Westlaw, enough cases were
filed to enable my research assistant to survey the reported decisions to
determine whether any interesting patterns emerged.
My research assistant looked at state decisions published during a
four-year period. For each case, he recorded: (1) whether the debtor was
a business or a person; (2) under what chapter the case was filed;
(3) whether the lawyer accused of misconduct was a first-time offender
or a repeat offender; (4) the ethics rule involved; and (5) the sanction for
the violation (if the lawyer was found to have violated the ethics rule).
Although the number of cases that we found was too small to
provide any hope of statistical significance, we did find that the typical
sanction differed depending on the ethics violation and-not

55. The remarkable H.C. Chang.
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surprisingly-that the sanctions were worse when the lawyer was not a
first-time offender. Of the six conflicts cases, the typical sanction was
suspension; of the fourteen competency cases, the typical sanction was
disbarment. Disgorgement was the typical sanction in both the twentytwo cases involving the reasonableness of fees and the nineteen cases
involving disinterestedness under section 327(a). I have not yet had a
chance to analyze the disciplinary cases for other patterns-for example,
patterns involving the chapter, the type of debtor, or the geographic
region.
C. Anecdotal Interviews
Although it would be nice if I could get hard empirical data from
docket sheets or reported cases, I don't think that the issues lend
themselves to a search of those sources. My next step will be to
interview various stakeholders in bankruptcy cases here in Houston to
see if any patterns arise. I plan to interview bankruptcy judges,
bankruptcy lawyers, standing trustees, lawyers in the Office of the U.S.
Trustee, and members of the Commission for Lawyer Discipline. 6
To date, the most challenging part of the anecdotal interviews has
been the application for Internal Review Board approval from the
University. Because I will be talking to humans, rather than looking at
documents, I needed to be able to explain the risks involved in
participating in the study. The most likely risk is that I would hear about
unethical behavior, some of which might be reportable to the
Commission for Lawyer Discipline. On the other hand, the likelihood of
someone revealing his own ethical violation is probably pretty small. I
am more likely to hear about unnamed "other" lawyers, which will
56. The Texas State Bar disciplines attorneys through the Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
which is composed of nine members-six attorneys and three public members. See TEX. R.
DISCIPLINARY P. 4.01, reprinted in TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (Vernon
1998). Each member serves a three-year term, unless he or she is disqualified on other grounds. See
id. R. 4.02. The lawyer members are appointed by the president of the State Bar. See id. The public
members are appointed by the Texas Supreme Court. See id. The president of the State Bar also
designates a lawyer member to chair the Commission, and another member to serve as vice chair,
each for a one-year term. See id. R. 4.05. The Commission will report the final disposition of any
disciplinary proceeding or action resulting in the imposition of a sanction, other than the sanction of
a private reprimand, to the Clerk of the Texas Supreme Court. See id. R. 6.05. All cases involving
the professional misconduct or disability of an attorney that have been appealed to the Courts of
Appeals or to the Texas Supreme Court must be published in the official reporter system. See id.
R. 6.06. The final disposition of all disciplinary proceedings or actions is reported to the Texas Bar
Journal and sent for publication to a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the
disciplined attorney lives or works. See id. R. 6.07. Private reprimands are published in the Teras
Bar Journal with the name of the attorney deleted. See id.
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obviate the need to report the violations. The letter inviting subjects to
participate in the study spells out this possible risk."
I hope to ask the bankruptcy lawyers how they do conflicts checks
and (at least as important) how they resolve conflicts.5 8 I want to hear
examples of ethics problems that standing trustees and U.S. Trustees
may have seen. I also want to find out more about the state disciplinary
cases that were published-and the ones that weren't (and why). I
haven't yet had a chance to start preparing for the interviews, so it's a bit
early to tell if this inquiry will be useful to test my hypothesis.
V.

ULTIMATE

GOAL: DRAFTING SOME NEWv RULES

There's a long way yet to go before I can think about what model
rules of bankruptcy ethics might look like. Depending on what I see in
the anecdotal interviews, I may well want to propose only one simple
rule for Chapter 11 cases. 9 If I'm right about the need for a new rule in
Chapter 11 cases, but not in cases filed under Chapters 7, 12, or 13, then
some of the problems with enacting a new rule across all bankruptcy
cases will be obviated. If, on the other hand, the anecdotal evidence
points to problems across bankruptcy chapters, then I will have to
grapple with a broader set of rules and their concomitant problems.
The advantages of enacting a rule in Chapter 11 to cover conflicts
issues in Chapter 11 are twofold: first, the rule's presence in Chapter 11
makes it clear that the rule does not apply in cases under Chapters 7, 12,
or 13 ;'0 and second, the rule is more likely to apply just in commercial
cases, where the likelihood of simultaneous representation of two or
more parties is highest. The trick, of course, is in what the rule would
say and how it would work vis-4-vis the other ethics rules to which the
lawyer might already be subject.
We would want the rule to focus on the actual harm to clients of
conflicts of interest in the case, rather than on the assumption that all
conflicts are per se disabling. In particular, we would want the rule to
recognize that some conflicts are difficult to predict at the onset of a case
57. For a sample of the invitation letter, see infra Appendix.
58. Including whether, when they have to refer out a case, they refer the case to the same firm
time after time-and whether there are any advantages to repeated referrals (such as reciprocal

referrals).
59. well, it's not so simple a rule that I can suggest it here. I still need some time-and some
additional data-gathering-before I can even think about proposing a workable rule.
60. I don't want to get into whether the new ethics rule would apply to railroad
reorganizations yet. If I know only a little about Chapter 12 cases, I know even less about railroad
reorganizations. So let's assume that the rule is enacted only for the portion of Chapter 11 that
doesn't apply to railroad reorganizations.
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and that the conflicts that are the most difficult to predict may or may
not ever occur in the case.6' Such conflicts-those that I have called
DTACs, for dormant, temporary, actual conflicts-have multiple
permutations and varying severity. 62 We would want the rule to be able
to distinguish between the garden-variety actual conflicts that traditional
ethics rules cover and this shifting of allegiances that are characteristic
of the DTACs in Chapter 11 cases. Most important, we should make
sure that the rule protects the clients in the case and not just the lawyers'
pocketbooks. The rule should not allow lawyers to circumvent obvious
conflicts that adversely affect the lawyer's relationship with the client.
Why might we want to limit this rule to cases under Chapter 11?
For one thing, if-as part of the rule-all other rules are to be
suspended, we will want to be careful about stepping on the toes of the
states' normal regulation of attorney conduct. The fewer lawyers who
might be "opting out" of the state ethics rules, the fewer disciplinary
cases the bankruptcy judges would have to decide. And, in the first
instance, it would be the bankruptcy judges who would be hearing
allegations of violations of the rules.
For another thing, I still don't have enough of a handle on what
distinguishes "consumer" from "commercial" practice, especially in
terms of how the two practices differ with respect to conflicts issues.
From my e-mail discussions with Harlin Womble, a Texas bankruptcy
practitioner, it may well be that the consumer firms that do debtor work
don't also do creditor work, 63 which reduces (but doesn't eliminate) the
number of potential conflicts.
A. A Very Rough Cut at a Chapter11 Rule Regarding
Conflicts of Interest.
Let's say that Congress enacted Code § llxx, which might read
something like this:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of
that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:

61.
62.
63.
Author)

See Rapoport, PotentialConflicts, supra note 1, at 915-16.
See id. at 924.
See E-mail from Harlin Womble, to Nancy B. Rapoport (Nov. 29, 2001) (on file with
[hereinafter November E-mail].
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(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation
will not be adversely affected; and
(2) the client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer for a party in interest in a Chapter 11 case is not
precluded from simultaneously representing other parties in
interest in the same case simply because the clients' interests
might potentially conflict, provided that:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the issues likely to be
raised in the case are not likely to cause an actual conflict of
interest between one client and another client; or

(2)
(i) the lawyer reasonably believes that any actual
conflict of interest between one client and another client
that arises during the case is or will be limited to a
particular issue raised in the case and that the resolution
of that issue will not be material 4 to the representation
of either client; and
(ii) both clients have consented to the lawyer's
representation of each of them with respect to the nonmaterial conflict.

(3)
(i) the lawyer reasonably believes that any potential
conflict of interest between one client and another client
that arises during the case is or will be limited to a
particular issue raised in the case and that the resolution
of that issue will not be material to the representation of
either client, and
(ii) both clients have consented to the lawyer's limited
suspension of representation of each of them with
respect to, and only for the duration of, the non-material
conflict.
(c) A lawyer must withdraw from representing both clients for
the remainder of the case if the lawyer concludes that either:

64. My working definition of "material"
confidentiality or zealousness concerns."

is "something that involves the client's
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(1) any actual conflict of interest between one client and
another client that arises during the case is not limited to a
particular issue raised in the case; or
(2) the resolution of that issue is material
representation of either client.

to the

(d) When representation of multiple clients in a single Chapter
11 case is undertaken, the consultation with the clients shall:
(1) include a written 5 explanation of the implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks
involved; and
(2) specifically state, as part of the written explanation, that
in the event of a nonmaterial actual conflict, the lawyer may
choose to continue the representation of both clients
pursuant to (b)(2) above or choose to suspend the
representation of both clients for the duration of that
nonmaterial conflict pursuant to (b)(3) above.
(e) If, pursuant to (d), the lawyer chooses to continue the
representation of both clients during the conflict, the lawyer
must represent both clients fairly and must not:
(1) prefer one client's interest to the other's; or
(2) decide to represent only one client, and not the other.
(f) This rule shall apply to the exclusion of all other conflict of
interest rules to which counsel might be subject, including all
state conflict of interest rules of the state or states in which
counsel is admitted to practice, all other conflict of interest rules
adopted by the bankruptcy court in which the Chapter 11 case
was filed, and all other applicable conflict of interest rules for so
long as:
(1) the Chapter 11 case is open; or
(2) if the case has been converted to a case under Chapter 7,
until that Chapter 7 case has been closed or dismissed.

65. We'd probably have to change the Chapter 11 definitions provision, I1 U.S.C. § 101
(1994), to include a definition of "written" that incorporates the Uniform Commercial Code concept
of "record," which could be either electronic or paper-based. See U.C.C. § 9-102(69) (2001).
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(g) A lawyer who violates this section is subject to sanctions that
may include, but are not limited to:
(1) disallowance
representation;

of

fees

relating

to

the

wrongful

(2) disgorgement of fees;
(3) a monetary fine; or
(4) the prohibition from practice in that court, either
permanently or for a specified period.
(h) No discipline resulting from a violation of this section shall
be used to create reciprocal discipline by another jurisdiction to
which the lawyer has been or is currently admitted.
B. How Would Code § 11xx Work?
Code § 1lxx tries to accomplish three objectives. First, it looks at
conflicts on an issue-by-issue basis, in an attempt to distinguish those
conflicts that really are pure, unadulterated, actual conflicts from those
that are extremely issue-specific. By importing some of the language and
some of the structure of Model Rule 1.7, 66 Code § 1 lxx tries to
distinguish the wholesale representation of every single party in interest
in the case (a bad thing) from selective representation of more than one
party in interest in a case when the parties' interests are either not likely
to conflict or, if they do conflict, will only conflict temporarily and not
in a way that affects the entire, case-long representation. Second, when a
DTAC does occur, Code § 1lxx(b) tries to give the lawyer for multiple
parties in interest the option of either continuing to represent the clients
(if both clients consent) during the resolution of that particular issue or
of suspending67 the representation of both clients for the duration of that
particular issue. Note the use of "reasonable belief' here: If the lawyer
knows or should have known that he could not represent both clients in
the resolution of a particular DTAC, then he cannot use § 1 lxx(b) as a
safe harbor. Finally, Code § l lxx(f) intentionally supplants, for a
specified time, all other ethics rules to which the lawyer might be
66. See MODEL RULES, supranote 7, R. 1.7.
67. I chose the word "suspend" rather than "withdraw" because "withdraw" connotes a
permanent stepping-away from the entire representation, while "suspend" reflects the temporary
nature of the stepping-away from the issue in question.
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subject. Lawyers are already subject to a variety of ethics rules if they
are admitted to more than one bar. The last thing that they need is one
more layer of confusion. Instead, in the special circumstance of
representing a party in interest in a Chapter 11 case, the only discipline
to which the lawyer is subject is the one that the bankruptcy judge can
mete out.6'
Let's try to apply Code § 1 lxx. Under this section, can a lawyer
represent both the debtor in possession ("DIP") and a creditor in the
case? Not under § 1lxx(a), which prohibits a lawyer from representing
multiple clients if the representation of that client may be materially
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, which it likely
would be. Can a lawyer represent two secured creditors in the same
case? Sure, if, for example, each security interest is in different
collateral, or if each security interest is incredibly oversecured; but not if
a valuation of Secured Creditor #1's interest in the collateral will affect
whether Secured Creditor #2's interest is secured, undersecured, or
unsecured. (Secured Creditor #2 would love to take more of Secured
Creditor #1's value, and Secured Creditor #1 surely doesn't want to give
any of its value away.) Can a lawyer represent a secured creditor and a
third-party purchaser of some of the DIP's assets (one of which involves
the secured creditor's collateral)? Sure, but not on that purchase. There's
no reason to drop the representation of the secured creditor generally as
long as someone else represents the two clients in the purchase issue.
And some of the more esoteric issues that might crop up, such as two
unsecured creditors whose interests converge except with regard to
favoring a particular plan of reorganization, get resolved more easily
with Code § 1lxx. Both unsecured creditors can have the same counsel
for most of the case, and only if the creditors differ in their vote will the
DTAC on the vote call for a decision under § 1lxx(b). At first glance,
the rule, if cumbersome, doesn't seem horrible to use. 69
C. Problems with Code § I1xx
I'm not convinced that Code § 1lxx can really work, even though I
like it better than the patchwork quilt of current ethics rules that are out
there. Ignoring the political issue of trying to supplant state ethics
codes-not to mention the problem of novice bankruptcy lawyers who

68. Of course, the appeal would go through the same process as any other appeal of a decision
in a bankruptcy case.
69. Well, at least it doesn't seem horrible to me.
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might not even know that the code section exist 7 0-there are several
workability problems. All of the phrases in Code § 1lxx that require the
lawyer to make judgment calls--"reasonably believes," "material,"
"particular issue"--call for bankruptcy expertise, and not all lawyers are
that knowledgeable about bankruptcy. Lawyers who repeatedly misjudge
the propriety of simultaneous representations will only be disciplined
within the structure of the bankruptcy court system. Because those
repeated violations will not trigger reciprocal discipline in the states,7 it
is possible that a bad lawyer could violate Code § llxx repeatedly
without fear of being punished by the state in which he is licensed.
Another major problem with this draft is that it doesn't deal directly with
imputed disqualification of an entire firm based on one lawyer's
conflicts problems."2 Finally, the rough draft above makes no distinction
between bad (but innocent) choices about simultaneous representation
and deliberate flouting of all conflicts rules. This rule has to be one that
does more than preserve an oligopoly among the "regular players"-those who appear in every major Chapter 11 case. The danger of
preserving an oligopoly is that the oligopoly may assume, over time, that
no rule applies to its members.
Obviously, this draft needs a lot of work. But someone has to be
brave (or foolhardy) enough to test the waters. Even if we were able to
overcome the problems with Code § 1lxx, there's still at least one more
related rule that we'd have to develop: one that clarifies just exactly who
the counsel for the DIP represents.73 Does the DIP counsel represent the
DIP (the business being run during the bankruptcy case) or the estate
created by the bankruptcy filing? If the DIP counsel really represents the
estate, what does that mean in practical terms when deciding what
options to pursue as the case develops? 74
Your head is probably spinning as you consider all of these
questions. The good news is that there's no need to resolve any of these
questions now. We should wait until we've had a chance to look at the
real cases out there. Empirical analysis can indicate whether rules of this
70. Although I have no idea what a novice bankruptcy lawyer would be doing in a Chapter 11
case, at least without supervision (and some hefty malpractice insurance coverage).
71. See§llxx(h).
72. See November E-mail, supra note 63. This problem may well extend beyond the
"commercial" practice to the "consumer' practice. Think of conflicts involving husbands and wives,
or roommates, or small companies. See, e.g., E-mail from Harlin Womble, to Nancy B. Rapoport
(Jan. 4, 2002) (on file with Author).
73. See, e.g., DIP's Attorney, supra note 1, at58-59.
74. Interests of the business owners are often not the same as those of the unsecured creditors,
or of the secured creditors, or of a third-party purchaser of the business.
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sort would be on the right track. Until we know more about the real
world of bankruptcy ethics, we shouldn't make the problems worse by
guessing about proposed solutions."

75. If only Congress would likewise hold off on bankruptcy amendments until it had more
empirical data about whether the current Code is capable of handling abuses, we'd all be better off.
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APPENDIX
EXCERPTS FROM INTERNAL REVIEW BOARD APPLICATION

Attachment #1-ProposedLetter to be Sent to Interviewees
- [Judge/Attorney/other bankruptcy professional]:
As part of research funded by
and the University
of Houston Law Center, I am conducting a series of interviews with
bankruptcy professionals and other legal professionals concerning
professional responsibility issues in consumer and commercial
bankruptcy cases. In order for me to study this topic, I need your
cooperation.
Would you please let me know if you would agree to be
interviewed, either by me personally or by one of my research assistants,
regarding the behavior of bankruptcy lawyers that you have observed?
ALL INFORMATION THAT YOU PROVIDE DURING THE
INTERVIEW,
INCLUDING
INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING
PARTICULAR LAW FIRMS OR INDIVIDUAL ATI'ORNEYS, WILL
BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
If you are interested in participating, please contact Susan
Evangelist at (713) 743-2100. If you have any questions, please let me
know. Thank you for your consideration. ANY QUESTIONS
REGARDING YOUR RIGHTS AS A RESEARCH SUBJECT MAY
BE ADDRESSED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON
COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
((713) 743-9204). ALL RESEARCH PROJECTS THAT ARE
CARRIED OUT BY INVESTIGATORS ARE GOVERNED BY
REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY AND THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT.
Very truly yours,
Nancy B. Rapoport
Dean and Professor of Law
Dear
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Attachment #2-ProposedInformed Consent Form
INFORMED CONSENT FORM
BANKRUPTCY ETHICS ISSUES STUDY
You are invited to participate in a study regarding the practices and
behavior of lawyers in bankruptcy cases. This is part of a research
project that involves the review of docket sheets, section 341 meeting
transcripts, bankruptcy cases, and cases from the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, along with interviews of professionals who are knowledgeable
about bankruptcy practice in this area. Although this research will not
provide any direct benefits to you, this research will be helpful in
analyzing whether, and how, current ethics codes should be changed to
more accurately reflect the unique issues faced by bankruptcy
practitioners. This data will be used for educational and publication
purposes. The interviews will be taped; the tapes will be stored in a
secure location available only to the research staff; and, upon conclusion
of the analysis of the research, the tapes will be destroyed. You will be
one of approximately 500 subjects participating in this project.
Because we will be studying professional responsibility behavior,
there is a risk that we will uncover behavior that should be reported to
the Office of Disciplinary Counsel; however, unless we have first-hand
knowledge of such behavior, we will not report any such behavior.
We anticipate that this interview will take no more than an hour and
a half of your time. ALL INFORMATION THAT YOU PROVIDE
DURING THE INTERVIEW, INCLUDING INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING PARTICULAR LAW FIRMS OR INDIVIDUAL
ATTORNEYS, WILL BE KEPT STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.
Although we will be recording identifying information regarding each of
the interviews, we will maintain strict confidentiality concerning the
identities of our interview subjects. At most, individual subjects will
only be identified by indicating the membership of the particular group
being interviewed (e.g., "a bankruptcy lawyer," "a bankruptcy judge,"
etc.). We will use codes and pseudonyms in any publications, and the list
that matches interview subjects with their codes or pseudonyms will be
kept separate from the data and will be available only to the Principal
Investigator.
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Non-participation will
not result in penalty or loss of benefits to which you might otherwise be
entitled. You may end your participation at any time.
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If you have any questions about this study, please call Nancy
Rapoport, Dean and Professor of Law, at (713) 743-2100. She is the
Principal Investigator of this study.
We will provide you with a copy of this signed informed consent
form for your records.
ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING YOUR RIGHTS AS A
RESEARCH SUBJECT MAY BE ADDRESSED TO THE
UNIVERSITY
OF HOUSTON
COMMITTEE
FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS ((713) 743-9204). ALL
RESEARCH PROJECTS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT BY
INVESTIGATORS ARE GOVERNED BY REQUIREMENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Principal Investigator: Nancy B. Rapoport
Signature:
Date:
I consent to participating in this research.
Name:
(please print)
Signature:
Date:
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